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Abstract
We use microeconomic data to explore the eﬀects of a changing age-structure on
the UK’s aggregate personal savings rate. Our ﬁndings suggest that changes to the
population’s age structure age have had detectable, sustained, but, relative to the
yearly changes observed in the savings rate over the previous century, modest eﬀects
on aggregate personal sector savings. We estimate that the projected changes to the
U K ’ sa g es t r u c t u r eo v e rt h en e x t4 0y e a r sa r el i k e l yt or a i s et h eU K ’ ss a v i n g sr a t e
but by no more than 2 percentage points. We ﬁnd no basis for the view that the
aggregate savings rate will decline as a result of the anticipated ageing of the UK
population.
Classiﬁcation Code: G1, G10, G11
Key Words: Saving, ageing population
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The UK population is projected to age noticeably over the next 30 to 40
years: the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD), for example, esti-
mates that the proportion of the total UK population over the age of 65 will
rise from 15.6% in 2000 to 20.23% in 2025 and to 24.9% in 2040.1 Such a
substantial change in the UK’s age-structure could, in principle, have sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects on many features of the UK economy: for example on the
s t r u c t u r eo ft o t a ls p e n d i n g ;o nt h eh o u s i n gm a r k e t ;a n do nl a b o u rs u p p l y .I n
this paper we focus on another potentially important eﬀe c t-t h ei m p a c to n
aggregate savings. Speciﬁcally, using data from the UK Family Expenditure
Survey (FES)2 over the period 1969 to 1998, we ﬁrst derive estimates of how
consumption and income vary with age and date of birth. These estimates,
together with data on the UK’s age-structure in the past allow us to assess
how the UK savings rate - the ratio of savings to income - has moved in
response to changes in age-structure in the past. We compare these move-
ments with the actual behaviour of an independently constructed measure
of the savings rate over the period 1855-2001. We also use our estimates,
and projected changes in the UK’s future age-structure, to assess the likely
response of the UK’s savings rate to these changes over the next 40 years.
Broadly, we ﬁnd that a changing age-structure has had eﬀects on the
savings rate which, as one would expect, are slow-moving but which are
nevertheless detectable, though they have been obscured by the more dra-
matic changes in the savings rate caused by events which are speciﬁct o
particular years. Our estimates suggest that the projected changes in the
UK’s age-structure over the next 30 to 40 years will cause changes in the
personal savings rate that are similarly slow-moving and modest.
The paper is in three main sections sections. In a preliminary ﬁrst section
we discuss our measure of savings and some problems associated with it. In
the second we explain how we use microeconomic data to assess the inﬂuence
of age-structure on the aggregate savings rate. In the third we use those
estimates to explore the eﬀects that a changing age-structure has had in
the past and is likely to have over the next 40 years. We end with a set of
conclusions.
1These ﬁgures are based on the 2000-based Principal Projection, which is GAD’s central
projection.
2The FES is an annual cross-section survey of around 7,000 households (or around
20,000 individuals). It is a voluntary survey with a response rate of around 70%, collect-
ing detailed information on household and individual consumption and income, and on
household and individual characteristics. Until 1993 the data were released on a calendar
year basis; since then the data are organised by ﬁnancial year. Our source allows us to
derive 30 consecutive calendar years of household and individual data from 1969 to 1998.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 2
2 Savings and the Family Expenditure Survey
Our investigation of the eﬀects of demographic change on UK savings will
focus on personal sector savings.3 There are two reasons for this: ﬁrst,
personal sector savings are likely to be particularly sensitive to demographic
changes; and secondly our investigation is based primarily on the FES which
covers individuals and households. In this section we address two issues. The
ﬁrst concerns the reliability of FES-based aggregate savings estimates. To
do this we compare the aggregate personal sector savings rate published by
National Statistics (NS) with an estimate based on the FES. The second
issue is the possibility that, since they relate to persons a n db e c a u s eo ft h e
way pension contributions and beneﬁts are treated, the age-savings proﬁles
we estimate from FES data may give a distorted picture of the eﬀects on
savings of changes in age-structure.
2.1 The FES and National Accounts Savings Rates
To address the ﬁrst of these issues we compare the personal sector savings
rates implied by FES data with those published in the NS personal sector
accounts. For each single-year age group of adults in the FES sample (i.e.
individuals over 15) and for each calendar year, we computed means of
disposable income and consumption expenditures.4 Aggregate income and
consumption estimates were computed by weighting these means by the
known population shares in each cell. The FES aggregate personal sector
savings rate was computed from these aggregations.
The NS estimates of aggregate disposable income and consumption are
derived from the income and capital accounts for household and non-proﬁt
institutions.5 To allow a direct comparison with the FES estimates, two ad-
justments were required. First, the household savings rates reported by NS
(code: NRJS) includes in income an adjustment for changes in net equity of
households in pension funds, an item not included in the FES income deﬁn-
ition. For our NS income ﬁgure we adopted gross disposable income (code:
RPHQ) before the addition of the pension fund item. The second adjust-
ment involved the treatment of imputed rents from owner occupation, an
item that was discontinued in the FES income and consumption deﬁnitions
from 1992.6 The NS income and consumption estimates (codes: RPHQ and
RPQM respectively) were reduced by the owner-occupier imputation (code:
3National savings includes personal and corporate sector savings (the private sector),
and saving by the government and the rest of the world.
4Income data for individuals a r ee x p l i c i t l yr e p o r t e di nt h eF E Sb u tt od e r i v ei n d i v i d u a l
consumption expenditure we adopted a regression approach we explain below. Our reasons
for aggregating over the adult population (over 15) is also explained below.
5The FES covers households only and does not include non-proﬁt institutions.
6In our FES analysis, imputed rent from owner-occupation was removed from the pre-
1992 income and consumption data to ensure consistency over the whole data period.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 3
ADFU).
In Figure 1 we graph the resulting NS and FES personal sector savings
rates for the years 1971-1998. The starting point is 1971 rather than 1969 -
the year of the ﬁrst FES in our data set - because single-year estimates of age-
structure were available only from 1971. Overall, the NS and FES savings
rates show an acceptable degree of correspondence except for the period
1987 to 1990 when the FES-based estimates fail to pick up the decline in the
savings rate in the NS accounts. The NS mean savings rate over the period
1971-1998 is 5.485% and the mean FES rate is 5.612%. For our purposes -
to explain and forecast longer run trends in the aggregate savings rate due
to a changing age-structure (rather than its year to year changes) - the fact
that our micro-data yields similar savings rates on average to those in the
national accounts, and the close correspondence of the two series over much
of the period, suggests that our projections will provide a good guide on
average to the NS’s estimate of the UK’s aggregate personal savings rate, or
at least to the inﬂuence that a changing age-structure exerts on it.
2.2 Age-Savings Proﬁles
The age-savings proﬁles which are central to the results in this paper are
estimated from data on the incomes and expenditures of households or indi-
viduals. Such age-savings proﬁles may give a distorted picture of the eﬀects
of changes in age-structure on national savings because of the treatment
of pension contributions and beneﬁts. First, the savings of those who con-
tribute to pension funds whilst working are likely to be underestimated. In
household surveys such as the FES, employer contributions to an employee’s
pension fund are not recorded and so are not included in the calculation of
an individual’s income (or, therefore, her savings).7 Moreover, the interest
earned on the current value of an individual’s pension fund is not imputed
as income to the individual and so, again, individual income and savings
are underestimated for working-age individuals who are contributing to pri-
vate pensions. Consequently the age-savings proﬁles derived using personal
sector data will underestimate the full savings of working individuals. Our
data do not permit us to measure or estimate the employers’ pension con-
tributions nor impute to individuals the interest income from the current
value of their pension funds, and so we can do little but recognize that our
data are likely to underestimate the savings rate of the working population.
The second distortion to age-savings proﬁles based on personal sector
data arises from the treatment of pension beneﬁts. Income in the FES (and
in the personal sector national accounts) treats the entire pension bene-
ﬁt or annuity payment as income. As Deaton and Paxson (2000) point out,
7In the National Statistics personal sector accounts, personal savings are deﬁned as
income net of taxes and social contributions - the latter including funded and unfunded
pension contributions by employees and employers - minus personal consumption.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 4
this ‘misclassiﬁes the component of annuity disbursement that is not income
but comes from running down the underlying asset’ (p212). Any associated
decline in the value of the asset backing that annuity will aﬀect the institu-
tion paying the annuity - whose accounts do not of course appear in the FES.
Thus, for example, two otherwise identical individuals - one of whom has
built up his own stock of ﬁnancial assets and consumes the constant amount
in retirement which will reduce his ﬁnancial assets to zero at his (assumed
known) date of death, and another who, in eﬀect, gets a pension fund to pay
him an annuity8 so that he can consume exactly the same constant amount
- will be measured as having diﬀerent savings: the former will be measured
as dissaving, the latter as not. Age-savings proﬁles derived using personal
sector income and expenditure data are likely to reveal inﬂated savings rates
for the elderly, especially if private pensions are widespread. Later in the
paper we attempt to correct for this distortion by identifying the compo-
nent of pension income that can be attributed to the running down of the
underlying asset.
3 Estimating the relationship between the aggregate savings
rate and age-structure from microeconomic data
Our framework for examining the relationship between the UK’s age-structure
and its savings is the following deﬁnition of the economy’s personal sector












where yab is the average income of individuals aged a in period t,i . e . o f
p e o p l ew h ow e r eb o r ni ny e a rb = t − a; cab is the average consumption of
those aged a who were born in year b; nat is the proportion of the population
aged a in period t; A is the oldest age group; S is aggregate personal savings;
Y is aggregate personal income.
Broadly, our approach is to use a simple lifecycle framework which views
yab and cab as functions solely of age and date of birth - an age eﬀect and a
cohort eﬀect. We ﬁrst derive estimates of these cohort and age eﬀects - and
hence estimates of yab and cab - for the cohorts and age-groups we observe.
We then use these results to make estimates of the cohort and age eﬀects -
and hence of yab and cab - for the earlier and later cohorts that we do not
o b s e r v eb u tw h i c hw en e e di fw ea r et o‘ f o r e c a s t ’as a v i n g sr a t ef o rt h ey e a r s
after 1998 and before 1969. Finally, we combine all our estimates of yab and
cab, and past and projected population share data to assess what inﬂuence
a changing age-structure has had on the savings rate in the past and what
inﬂuence it is likely to exert in the future.
8We treat annuities and pensions as identical ﬁnancial assets. For simplicity we refer
to income derived from both as pensions.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 5
Before we can carry out this procedure we address three technical issues.
The ﬁrst is how to obtain estimates of individual income and consumption
from a survey whose unit of observation is the household.T h es e c o n di st h e
appropriate treatment of pension income. The third is how to estimate age
- and (especially) cohort - eﬀects for unobserved cohorts.
3.1 Estimating individual eﬀects from household data
Consumer theory focuses on the individual whereas, in surveys such as the
FES, the unit of observation is the household. Many empirical studies deal
with this problem by treating the household as an individual whose age
is that of the designated ‘head of household’. This is unsatisfactory on a
number of grounds: ﬁrst, the concept of head of household is contrived and
anachronistic; secondly, if individuals live in multi-generational households
the true relationship between age, consumption and income will be obscured;
and, thirdly, to the extent that the poorer elderly might be obliged to live
with their children whereas the better-oﬀ elderly continue to exist as inde-
pendent households, the income and consumption patterns of the elderly
might be systematically biased.
In fact, from the FES we can directly extract information on the income
of individual members of the household but we cannot directly extract in-
formation about the consumption of each individual. To extract that infor-
mation indirectly - and avoid the problems caused by treating the household
as an individual - we employ the technique adopted in Deaton and Paxson
(2000).9 As a check on the accuracy of this technique we also apply it to
income despite being able to extract individuals’ income directly, though
in all the results we report below, we use the direct measure of individual
income.
We extract estimates of individual income and consumption by regressing
household income in year t, yht, and consumption, cht, on naht,t h en u m b e r
of people in the household in age group in year t, where a indexes (single)
age-groups 1 to A.10 We interpret the coeﬃcient estimated on naht as the
average contribution to income (or consumption) made by people of that






where βaht is the average contribution (for this particular household) to
this household’s income of people aged a born in year t − a.W r i t eβaht =
9The approach we adopt has also been used recently by Chesher (1997, 1998) when
analysing individual nutrient intake. For earlier applications to consumer behaviour see
Mankiw and Weil (1989) and Weil (1994).
10For a more detailed discusssion of this procedure see Demery and Duck (2001).Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 6
βat + εaht, where βat is the average contribution (across all households) to
household income of individuals aged a in year t,a n dεaht is interpreted as
a deviation from this mean peculiar to household h in period t.




nahtβat + ηht (3)
where ηht ≡
PA
a=1 nahtεaht. Estimating equation (3) across households in
the FES, the average contribution of those aged a in period t is identiﬁed
as the coeﬃcient estimated on naht. This estimate would be unbiased if
there were no correlation between naht and the error term, which requires
that E (njhtεiht)=0for all j and i.W ed i s c u s st h ep o s s i b l ef a i l u r eo ft h i s
assumption below.
In a simple life-cycle model, an individual’s consumption at age a will
be proportional to his or her lifetime resources. The individual’s labour
income at age a can also be written as proportional to lifetime resources.
T h el i f e t i m eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t-t h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo fc o n s u m p t i o nm u s t
equal the present value of earnings and assets11 -a n dt h ep r o c e s sb yw h i c h
assets evolve allow the individual’s total income to be expressed as an age-
determined proportion of lifetime resources. Formally,
ciat = fi(a)Wi (4)
yiat = hi(a)Wi (5)
where ciat is the consumption of individual i aged a in period t; yiat is
t h ei n c o m eo fi n d i v i d u a li aged a in period t; Wi is the lifetime resources
of the individual; and fi(a) and hi(a) are respectively the age-determined
proportions of lifetime resources which the individual consumes and receives
as income when aged a.
Within this framework the estimated value of each βat can be interpreted
as an estimate of h(a)Wt−a,t h eaverage contribution to income of someone
aged a born in period t − a,w h i c hw ew r i t ea syab. A similar regression
involving consumption would provide an estimate of f(a)Wt−a,t h eaverage
contribution to consumption of someone aged a born in period t − a, cab.
Clearly both combine the average age eﬀects, h(a) or f(a),a n dt h ea v e r a g e
‘cohort eﬀect’ Wt−a .T od i s e n t a n g l et h et w oi nt h ec a s eo fi n c o m eo n ec a n
take logs of the estimates of βat and regress them on age and cohort (year
of birth) dummies.12 A similar technique can be used to derive an estimate
11Ignoring, for the moment, bequests.
12There is a possibility that some of the estimates of βat may be negative. For this
reason Deaton and Paxson (2000) employ a diﬀerent technique to extract the age and
cohort eﬀects. This problem does not arise in our case once we restrict age-groups - as we
do for reasons explained below - to those aged 16 and above.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 7
of the average contribution each age group and cohort makes to household
consumption. Formally, we carry out the regressions13
ln(cab)=Daαc + Dbγc + uc (6)
ln(yab)=Daαy + Dbγy + uy (7)
where cab and yab are our estimates of the combined average age and cohort
eﬀects on consumption and income respectively; Da and Db are matrices of
age and cohort (year of birth) dummies respectively; αc,a n dαy are each a
vector of coeﬃcients showing the eﬀects of age on consumption and income
respectively; γc,a n dγy are each a vector of coeﬃcients showing the eﬀects of
date of birth or cohort membership on consumption and income respectively;
and uc and uy are error terms.
The cohort dummies pick up both the eﬀects of changes in wealth be-
tween cohorts and any other factors that cause one cohort to behave dif-
ferently from another. Under simplifying assumptions - that bequests are
a ﬁxed proportion of lifetime resources and that lifetime consumption and
bequests together exhaust lifetime resources - the vectors of coeﬃcients, γc
and γy,s h o u l db ee q u a l .
An attractive feature of this approach is that it should reduce the sample-
selection bias which might result from the poorer elderly ‘disappearing’ from
the sample as they cease to be household heads. To the extent that they have
not been institutionalised but live with their children or in other households,
this sub-group’s behaviour will still contribute to the estimate of the relevant
βat and hence this term will not be so dominated by those who, by the
standards of their peers, are high earners and consumers.
In fact, as mentioned above, it is possible to obtain from the FES a direct
observation on the income of each member of each household and hence the
average income of each age group in each year. So, at least in the case of
income, the approach we have just described is unnecessary. However, the
fact that we can directly observe an individual’s income does allow us to
check the accuracy of the regression approach by comparing the regression
coeﬃcients βat with the sample means of individual incomes. Demery and
Duck (2001) estimated equation (3) across households in the FES for each
year between 1969 and 1998 and compared the estimates with the known
mean incomes of individuals by age. They found that: (a) the regression
method produced negative estimates for the mean incomes of individuals
less than 15 years old, whereas in fact their incomes were zero (or very close
13The regressions also include year dummies to pick up cyclical inﬂuences on income
and consumption, inﬂuences that are common to all ages and cohorts. Year eﬀects were
captured by including a set of T − 2 year dummies deﬁned from t =3 ,...,T as d
∗
t =
dt −(t−1)d2 −(t−2)d1 where dt is equal to one if the year is t and is zero otherwise (see
Deaton (1997)). The year dummy eﬀects sum to zero by construction.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 8
to zero);14 (b) the regression method over-stated the incomes of individuals
in the child-bearing ages, 20-45 years; (c) the regression method under-
estimated the incomes of the elderly - by around 8-10% in the over-60 year
age-groups. The fact that the regression bias is strongly associated with age
is of particular concern given our aim of deriving age proﬁles for income,
consumption and hence savings.
This bias may be because the number of individuals within the house-
hold by age is not independent of the residual in equation (3). For example,
the presence of children in the household may prevent one parent from work-
ing and therefore lower household income. There may, of course, be other
mechanisms which work in the opposite direction: for example, households
that are richer than average may have more children, leading to a positive
c o r r e l a t i o nw i t ht h ee r r o rt e r m .
The reasons for the downward bias in the estimates of the incomes of
elderly individuals is more diﬃcult to explain. One possibility is that if richer
households are more likely to place their elderly relatives in institutional care
we may observe more elderly members of poorer households and this may
explain the observed bias.
Demery and Duck (2001) found that the accuracy of the regression ap-
proach improved markedly if the ﬁrst 15 age-groups were omitted from equa-
tion (3). In particular, the ﬁrst two problems of the regression approach
mentioned above were eﬀectively overcome. However, the incomes of the
over-60s were still seriously underestimated.
Since we directly observe actual individual income, the problems associ-
ated with the regression method are not directly relevant in the case of in-
come, but they will apply to our estimates of individual consumption where
we are obliged to use the regression approach. Since we believe it highly
likely that the residual in the consumption equation is also likely to be cor-
related with the number of children, we follow Demery and Duck (2001) and
estimate the consumption equivalent of equation (3) by including only those
aged 16 and above. The possibility that, by using the regression approach,
we may underestimate the consumption of the elderly - and therefore over-
estimate their savings - remains. To address it we adjusted our estimates of
the contribution to household consumption of each age group by the (across-
years average) ratio of the known actual to predicted contribution of each
age group to household income. The results we report in this paper are
b a s e do nt h e s ec o r r e c t e dc o n s u m p t i o n - a g ep r o ﬁles.
14Deaton and Paxson, in their analysis of Taiwanese and Thai households, also obtain
negative income (and consumption) estimates for children and this forced them to use
procedures that avoided the need to take logarithms of negative number (see Deaton and
Paxson (2000), p. 220).Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 9
3.2 Pension income adjustment
In the previous section we discussed a number of possible distortions to the
age-savings proﬁle caused by the treatment of pension income. Some of
t h e s ew ec a nd ol i t t l ea b o u t ,b u tt h ed i s t o r t i o nc a u s e db yt h em i s c l a s s i ﬁ-
cation of annuity income highlighted by Deaton and Paxson (2000) can be
addressed.15
To correct for this potentially serious overestimate of retirement income
we make an adjustment to reported non-state pension income based on
the idea that interest earned on the underlying asset should be treated as
income, whereas the decline in the value of the underlying asset should
not. We derive an adjustment factor which attempts to identify empirical
counterparts to those conceptually diﬀerent components of pension beneﬁts.
In eﬀect we replace the reported ﬁgure with our estimate of the pure interest
income from non-state pensions.
To do this we ﬁrst calculate the present value of an annuity stream to
an individual j years into retirement with given probabilities of surviving
each subsequent period. We then treat the rate of interest times this present
value as the interest income from the annuity. More formally, assume an
individual who buys an annuity which promises to pay the sum P [1 + φπ]
i
at the end of period t + i for i ≥ 0, where P is some given nominal sum, π
is the (assumed constant) rate of inﬂation, and φ i st h ed e g r e eo fi n ﬂation
indexation. Let ft+j represent the probability that this individual will be
a l i v ea tt h ee n do fp e r i o dt+j given that he or she is alive at the beginning
of that period. At the beginning of period t + j the nominal present value
of this income stream will be:
NPVt+j =
P [1 + φπ]
j+1 ft+j
1+rn +




P [1 + φπ]
j+3 ft+j.ft+j+1.ft+j+2
[1 + rn]
3 + ...... (8)
where rn is the nominal rate of interest. Our estimate of the interest income
from the annuity will be rnNPVt+j. The actual income the individual will be
reported as receiving in period t+j will be P [1 + φπ]
j+1.H e n c et h efraction
of reported income that we will attribute to interest income in period t+j
15Jappelli and Modligliani (1998) attempt to overcome this problem by omitting pen-
sion income altogether, treating all pension beneﬁts as a ‘decumulation of the stock of
pension wealth’ (p.11). Using Italian cohort data, they ﬁnd, on making this adjustment
a more hump-shaped pattern to the savings-age proﬁle and negative savings for the el-
derly. Bosworth et al. (1991) also treat all pension beneﬁts as dissaving. Miles (1999)
also suggests that part of the measured high savings rates amongst the elderly is due to
the treatment of pension beneﬁts.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 10
for someone who retired in period t will be:
Ft+j =
rn.NPVt+j














For some of the results we report in the next section, we apply this
adjustment factor to reported non-state pension income.16 This requires
assumptions about the nominal interest rate, the expected rate of inﬂation,
the degree of indexation, and survivorship rates. We assume that in each
year the nominal interest rate is that year’s average Treasury bill rate; that
there is a constant expected real interest rate of 3%; that the inﬂation rate
expected in year x is the diﬀerence between the nominal interest rate and
the assumed real interest rate; and that the inﬂation rate expected in year
x is also expected to continue thereafter. Survivorship rates were derived
as follows: for the years 1980-1999 they were provided by the Government
Actuary’s Department;17 for the earlier years they were computed from
mid-year single-age population estimates.18 F o re a c hy e a rw ea s s u m e dt h a t
no-one aged below 50 received pension or annuity income.19 Because of
the diﬃculty (see Finkelstein and Poterba (2000)) in obtaining data on the
extent to which non-state pensions are indexed we considered two cases:
the ﬁrst assumes that no pension income is indexed; the second that 25%
of pension income is fully indexed. Demery and Duck (2001) report that
the two sets of assumptions gave very similar results and in what follows we
report results based on those which assume 25% indexation.20
3.3 Estimating age and cohort eﬀects for unobserved cohorts
Since one of our main aims is to assess the likely eﬀects of projected popu-
lation changes on the future aggregate UK savings rate, we shall need some
estimate of the age and cohort eﬀects for cohorts who are as yet unborn or,
at least, who do not yet ﬁgure in our data set. To assess the inﬂuence of age
structure on past savings rates we also require estimates of earlier cohort
eﬀects for cohorts which do not appear in our data set.
16We treat the state pension as a transfer from one generation to the next and do not
apply the adjustment factor. The proportion of income attributed to non-state pensions
for households with heads aged 65 and above rose from approximately 12% in 1969 to
about 30% in 1998.
17We are grateful to Steve Smallwood of the Government Actuary’s Department for
providing us with mortality date for the period 1980-1999.
18This latter approach ignores the eﬀects of migration on the grounds that these eﬀects
are small over the relevant age group.
19In fact there are a small number of people in each year who receive annuity income
who are below the age of 50.
20Findings reported by Finkelstein and Poterba (2000) and by Murthi, Orzsag and
Orzsag (1999) suggest this 25% indexation may be an overestimate (at least for the private
sector) and hence the proportion we attribute to interest income may be on the high side.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 11
For the age eﬀects, the solution we shall adopt is straightforward: we
shall assume that the age eﬀects for future cohorts are the same as those
estimated from the observed cohorts. Our estimates of these age eﬀects, i.e.
our estimates of αy and αc, are presented in Figures 2A and 2B. Those in
Figure 2A are based on the standard measure of income (i.e. no adjustment
for the treatment of pension income) and consumption corrected in the way
described above. We refer to these as Model A results. Those presented in
Figure 2B are based on adjusted income and corrected consumption. We
refer to these as Model B results. Recall that Model B incorporates an
adjustment aimed at securing a more accurate estimate of the relationship
between age-structure and personal income (and hence saving) for the econ-
omy as a whole; Model A makes no such adjustment and will therefore
provide a less accurate guide to this relationship the more the adjustment
is required, i.e. the more wide-spread are non-state pension funds and the
greater the proportion of older individuals in the population.21
Both sets of estimates of αy and αc show signs of a hump-shape. Income
in particular rises to a peak in the mid 40-50 age-groups though both age-
income proﬁles also show a tendency for income to rise with age beyond the
age of 70 - a result that may be due to positive correlation between longevity
and wealth (see Attanasio and Hoynes (1995)). This feature is, of course,
less pronounced in the case of Model B where we have adjusted income
downward to allow for the misallocation of part of any annuity disbursement.
Figure 3, which plots the relationship between age and the savings ratio
(deﬁned here as lnyab − lncab) for the cohort born in 1953, shows that the
adjustment to income clearly has a signiﬁcant qualitative impact on the
predicted relationship between an economy’s age-structure and its savings.
Without any adjustment to income, savings are predicted to be higher for
an economy with a high proportion of elderly people; with the adjustment
savings are predicted to be lower.
The problem of estimating unobserved cohort eﬀects is more diﬃcult
and is highlighted in Figure 4 which shows our estimates of the income and
consumption cohort eﬀects, γy and γc respectively, for Model B.22 Because
our data are from the FES over the period 1969-1998, and since we use age-
groups from 16 years to 80 (and above),23 we can directly estimate cohort
eﬀects only for those born between the years 1889 and 1982. Furthermore,
21The savings rate implied in Model A corresponds to the personal sector savings rate
published in the national accounts (ignoring the equity adjustment discussed above). The
implied aggregate savings rates from Model B would be closer to a savings rate derived
from a consolidation of the accounts of the personal and ﬁnancial sectors. However because
Model B underestimates the savings of working individuals, it will underestimate the true
‘consolidated’ savings rate.
22The cohort estimates for Model A are virtually identical to those estimated for Model
B.
23We assume that individuals over 80 years old have the same age and cohort charac-
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our estimates of the very earliest and most recent cohort eﬀects are based on
fewer and fewer observations. For example, the cohort born in 1982 appear
only once in our data - as 16 year-olds in the 1998 FES; the cohort born in
1981 appear twice - as 16 year-olds in the 1997 FES and as 17 year-olds in the
1998 FES. Since they are based on such a small number of observations, the
very earliest and most recent cohort eﬀects are likely to be erratic. Figure
4 suggests that this is indeed the case. The estimated ‘extreme’ cohort
eﬀects behave quite diﬀerently from those in the ‘middle’. Their erratic
behaviour suggests that they are not only dubious in themselves but are
likely to provide a poor foundation for projecting into the future (or the
past).24
One method suggested by Deaton and Paxson (2000) for estimating the
future savings rate which bypasses this problem is to assume that the income
and consumption cohort eﬀects are identical and primarily the result of
lifetime wealth diﬀerences. On the assumption that each cohort’s life-time
resources equal those of its immediate predecessor times a constant growth








a=1 [1 + g]
t−a (eγay − eγac)nat
PA
a=1 [1 + g]
t−a(eγay)nat
(10)
These assumptions would allow us to make forward (and backward) pre-
dictions of the savings rate for any period for which we have population
proportions.
The estimates of the ‘middle’ (and more reliable) cohort eﬀects strongly
suggest a more or less constant growth in the cohort eﬀect of around 2%
per annum, which is, of course, close to the long-run growth rate of the
UK economy, and is consistent with the Deaton and Paxson (2000) view.
However, we have not adopted their approach because of the clear evidence
from Figure 4 and from the tests reported in Demery and Duck (2001) that
whilst their growth rates might be very similar, the levels of the income and
consumption cohort eﬀects are quite diﬀerent.25
A sa na l t e r n a t i v ew eh a v ea d o p t e dt h ef o l l o w i n ga p p r o a c h .W et a k eo u r
original estimates of the 1936 cohort eﬀects for income and consumption as
our base. This is the cohort which is at the centre of those cohorts appearing
in each FES over the period 1969-98. We then calculate the average growth
(or change in the log) of these estimated cohort eﬀects over the n years
before and after 1936. We considered a range of values for n but always
24The same argument does not apply to the various age groups since each age group
appears in each FES data set.
25Demery and Duck (2001) estimated age eﬀects after imposing the restriction that
cohort eﬀects for income and consumption are the same. They found that the estimates
of age eﬀects were largely unaﬀected but that the restriction itself could be formally
rejected. One possible reason for this is that the assumptions about the bequest motive -
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one such that the ﬁrst and last cohorts used to calculate the average growth
appear in all 30 FES surveys. So, n never exceeds 17 since the 1953 cohort is
the last cohort to appear in all FES data-sets. In fact the choice of n made
little diﬀerence to the estimated growth rates, which ranged from 1.8% to
2% per annum. We then applied our preferred estimated growth rates of
1.9% forwards and backwards to generate our new estimates of γy and γc.I n
Figures 5 and 6 we show the relationship between these (re-)estimates of γy
and γc ( w i t ha na s s u m e dg r o w t hr a t eo f1 . 9 %p e ra n n u m )a n do u ro r i g i n a l
estimates. Clearly the re-estimates track the behaviour of the originals well
until the last (and possibly erratic) twenty or so cohorts.
By projecting these growth rates forward (or backward) we can derive
estimates of yab and cab for any cohorts in the future and the past.26 We can
then use equation (1) to explore the implications for the aggregate savings
rate of any past or future changes in the age-structure of the population.27
This procedure maintains the strong assumption of the lifecycle model
that there is no interaction between age and cohort eﬀects, i.e. that the
age proﬁles for diﬀerent cohorts are parallel. The fact that the more-recent
estimated cohort eﬀects are not only erratic but are also always below our
estimated trend may signal that this assumption is incorrect. For example,
if, because more of them go to university, the more-recent cohorts have
income age proﬁles with less weight at the start of their life cycles, we would
expect to ﬁnd declining cohort eﬀects when, in our estimation procedure,
we restrict the age eﬀects to be cohort-independent. The cohort eﬀect will
be ‘picking up’ a distortion to the age proﬁle for the more recent cohorts.
However, the size of the dip below trend, and the complete absence
of any such dip throughout the ‘middle period’, suggests to us that this
is implausible. An alternative possibility is that the more recent cohorts
were coming onto the labour market at a time of recession: the estimated
coeﬃcients on the year dummies in the income equation - which sum to zero
overall and are assumed to be independent of both cohort and age eﬀects
- declined over the period 1990-1994 and are all negative for the period
1992-1997. If new labour-market entrants are disproportionately aﬀected by
recession then our estimates of their cohort eﬀects may be biased downwards
because the cohort estimate is picking up this distortion. So this distortion
-t o g e t h e rw i t ht h es m a l ln u m b e ro fo b s e r v a t i o n so nw h i c ht oe s t i m a t et h e i r
particular cohort eﬀect - may explain why the estimates for the later cohorts
26One practical restriction that this method imposes is that the growth rates of the
income and consumption cohort eﬀects must be the same. If they are not, the diﬀerence
between them dominates the projection of the savings rate. In practice, the estimated
growth rates were very close.
27The choice of the year of birth on which to base these re-estimates does have impli-
cations for the savings rate we predict. As a close examination of Figures 5 and 6 reveal,
the 1935 cohort eﬀect is low. We did carry out the estimates reported below taking the
1935 cohort as our base. The general behaviour of the agggregate savings rate was much
the same as that reported below but was approximately 1 percentage point lower.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 14
are both erratic and low. And, on this latter interpretation, the assumption
of independence between age and cohort eﬀects, which we use to estimate
future cohort and age aﬀects, can be maintained.
4 The savings rate and changes in the UK’s age-structure
Having explained our approach we now present our estimates of the extent to
which changes in its age-structure have aﬀected the UK’s aggregate savings
rate in the past and are likely to in the future.
4.1 Age structure and the savings rate 1855-2001
Figure 7 shows the actual behaviour over the period 1855-2001 of four broad
age-proportions: the young, 15-29 year olds; the early middle-aged, 30-44
year olds; the late middle aged, 45-64 year olds; and the elderly, those
aged 65 and above.28 They clearly show that, over the last 100 years, the
population has noticeably aged - in fact to an even greater extent than it is
projected to over the period 2001 to 2040. The proportion of the population
aged over 65 has increased almost monotonically, with a marked increase
in trend after 1900. It rose from 7% in 1930 to 14% in 1975. The trend
decrease in the proportion of the population in the 15-29 age group has only
been interrupted by the ‘baby boom’ after the second World War.
The thinner line in Figure 8 shows the behaviour of the aggregate per-
sonal savings rate - constructed by the authors from macroeconomic data
s o u r c e sa n di ni t sl a t e ry e a r se q u a lt ot h eN Sp e r s o n a ls e c t o rs a v i n g sr a t e
- over the same period. Its behaviour has clearly been dominated by the
two World Wars and by short term ﬂuctuations. The thicker and dotted
lines show the savings rate ‘predicted’ by applying the techniques explained
in the previous sections of this paper to Model A and Model B deﬁnitions
of income and consumption respectively.29 Clearly, this ﬁgure suggests that
the eﬀects of changes in age-structure are slow-moving but are neverthe-
less detectable but are liable to be dwarfed and obscured by much sharper
shorter-term movements, especially the eﬀects of the two World Wars. The
most obvious eﬀect is the substantial long-term rise over the ﬁrst half of the
28The data for the population and savings series were derived from published sources
by the authors and are explained fully in Demery and Duck (2003). The early population
ﬁgures involved a certain amount of interpolation and so the proportions appear a little
smoother than they probably really are.
29Of course for all the pre-1936 cohorts we we have applied the growth factor -1.9%
rather than +1.9%. The projections shown for the 1969-1998 period ignore the estimated
eﬀects of the year dummies for those years.
For the early part of this period the population proportions were only available in
5-yearly groups. To construct an aggregate savings rate we had then to apply these
proportions to the average income and consumption of each 5-year age group predicted
using our FES-based estimates of the yearly age and cohort eﬀects.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 15
20th century, a slight fall over the next 20 years, and a rise until the end of
the century.
Given the shape of the savings-age proﬁles shown in Figure 3 and the his-
torical behaviour of the age-structure shown in Figure 7, our interpretation
of these movements is that they were primarily the result of the prolonged
rise in the proportion of the middle-aged from 1900 to the late 1950s, the
fall in that proportion from then until the late 1980s, and its subsequent
rise. The opposite movements in the proportion of the population who are
young reinforced these eﬀects on the aggregate savings rate. The somewhat
smaller rise in the savings rate associated with Model B from 1900 to 1955,
t h es h a r p e rf a l lf r o mt h el a t e1 9 5 0 su n t i lt h el a t e1 9 8 0 s ,a n dt h em o r em u t e d
rise since then are mainly the result of the key diﬀerence between Models A
and B: that in Model B an increase in the proportion of the elderly leads to
a larger fall in the economy’s overall savings rate.
4.2 The savings rate under alternative population projec-
tions: 2001-2040
In this section we investigate how the aggregate savings rate might change
o v e rt h en e x t3 0t o4 0y e a r si nr e s p o n s et oav a r i e t yo fd i ﬀerent projections
about the age-structure of the population. The projections are the 2000-
based projections of the UK Government Actuary’s Department:30 they
cover the years (2000 2001) 2002-2026, 2031, and 2036. To obtain an appro-
priate projected age-structure we then express each age group’s projected
population as a proportion of the total projected population 16 years old
and above.
We begin with a brief discussion of the assumptions behind the projec-
tions we use. The population projections are based on cohort fertility rates,
which are more stable than those for calendar years. So the fertility rates
used in the GAD projections are derived from assumptions relating to the
year in which women were born. For the United Kingdom as a whole, com-
pleted family size has been falling steadily from an average of around 2.45
children for women born in the mid 1930s. The family sizes to be achieved
by younger cohorts are highly conjectural, but for the Principal Projection
GAD assumed that average completed family size, for the United Kingdom
as a whole, will continue to decline until around the 1985 cohort and even-
tually level oﬀ at 1.74 children per woman. In its ‘High Fertility’ and ‘Low
Fertility’ variants, GAD assumes a levelling oﬀ at 1.94 and 1.54 children
respectively. The Principal Projection is based on continued increases in
life expectancy at birth, which is projected to rise to 79.7 years in 2040 for
males and to 83.9 years for females. The respective ‘High Life Expectancy’
30GAD have also recently produced a 2001-based set of projections. As we wished to
consider the ‘Very High Life Expectancy’ variant and as this was not available for the
2001-based projections, we use the 2000-based set of projections.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 16
and ‘Low Life Expectancy’ variants assume male life expectancy at birth to
rise to 81.9 and 77.5 years in 2040 and the corresponding ﬁgures for females
are 85.5 and 82.2 years. GAD also produced a ‘Very High Life Expectancy’
variant which assumed that life expectancy at birth rises to 83.5 years for
males and 87.1 years for females in the year 2040. This variant is assumed to
be broadly consistent with the high sensitivity variant produced by Eurostat
in 2000. To cover the broadest range of possible demographic projections
we consider four cases: the Principal Projection (i.e. GAD’s ‘central’ pro-
jection), a ‘Young’ Projection (combining the High Fertility and Low Life
Expectancy variants), an ‘Old’ Projection (combining the Low Fertility and
High Life Expectancy variants) and the ‘Very High Life Expectancy’ variant
(which combines the Eurostat very high life expectancy case with fertility
assumptions used in the Principal projection).31 These are scenarios that
are likely to lead to the widest range of population age-structures we can
expect over the coming decades.
In Table 1 we present the main features of the Principal Projection and
the variants we consider. The UK population rises to 65.8 million in 2040
under the assumptions used in the Principal Projection. The projected
population in 2040 is 8% higher (71.4 million) under the Young variant and
8% lower under the Old variant. The proportion over 65 years old projected
in 2040 ranges from 21% (Young variant) to nearly 28% (Old variant). To
illustrate the broad implications of these projections we graph in Figure 9
the age-structure implied by the Principal Projection.32 We have aggregated
the projections into four broad age-groups: the young, 15-29 year olds; the
early middle-aged, 30-44 year olds; the late middle aged, 45-64 year olds;
and the elderly, those aged 65 and above. The central feature of the ﬁgure
is that the proportion who are elderly will increase from below 20% in 2000
to almost 25% in 2040; the increase is marked up to the mid-2030s when it
slows down somewhat. The proportion who are late middle aged is projected
to increase for almost 20 years and then decrease and the proportions who
are young or early middle-aged are expected to fall.
In Figure 10 we plot the savings rate implied by combining the Principal
Projections and the Model A and Model B age and cohort eﬀects over the
period 1971 to 2040. The predicted series up to 2000 are those implied
by our estimates of the age and cohort eﬀects and the actual population
proportions. (We ignore the eﬀects of the year dummies for the purposes of
these projections, though they were included in the regressions from which
the age and cohort eﬀects were derived.) We also include in the ﬁgure the
31The Principal Projection assumes a long term annual net migration of +135,000 from
2002-03 onwards and this assumption is also used in the Very High Life Expectancy variant.
The Young projection is based on a higher long-term net migration ﬁgure of +195,000 and
the Old variant assumes a lower net migration ﬁgure of +75,000.
32The projections are annual up to 2026 and then for the individual years 2031, 2036
and 2040. The graph linearly interpolates the shares over the period 2026-40.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 17
relevant National Statistics personal sector savings rate.33
As the Model A savings rate is calculated on the assumption that all
pensions are treated as income, it is always higher than that of Model B,
where only a part of the pension is treated as income. As is clear from
the ﬁgure, in both models demographic changes anticipated in the Princi-
pal Projection imply changes in the aggregate savings rate that are quite
modest in comparison to the actual year-to-year ﬂuctuations that occurred
from 1971-1998. In Model A, the personal sector (long-run) savings rate is
predicted to rise gradually from 5.8% in 2000 to 6.5% in 2025 and 7.0% in
2040.
We interpret these predictions as follows. Our estimates of the age ef-
fects, as illustrated in Figure 3, suggest that increases in the proportion of
the population who are elderly will reduce Model B’s aggregate savings rate
but will either leave Model A’s rate unchanged - if it is oﬀset by a fall in
the proportion who are late middle-aged and if the elderly themselves are
not mainly over 70 - or will raise it. A rise in the proportion who are in
their late middle age will generally raise the aggregate savings rate in both
cases. Variations in the other age proportions are likely to have only modest
eﬀects on aggregate savings rates - unless changes in the young are due to
changes in the very young. In fact the proportion who are elderly is pre-
dicted to rise continuously over the next 40 years whereas the proportion
who are middle-aged is predicted to rise for the ﬁrst 20 years and then fall
back. The predicted rise in the proportion who are middle-aged is suﬃcient
to induce a rise in the predicted savings rate for both models, but, when this
is reversed, the continued rise in the proportion who are elderly is suﬃcient
to reduce the predicted aggregate savings rate in the case of Model B but
not in the case of Model A.
Figures 11A and 11B show the savings rates we predict on the basis of
the variant population projections (see Table 1): the rates in Figure 11A are
based on Model A and those in Figure 11B on Model B. A striking feature
of the predictions using Model A is the higher savings rates predicted from
the Old and Very High Life Expectancy variants: they are 0.5 percentage
points higher in 2040 than those from the Principal Projection. And the
savings rate predicted using the demographic structure of the Young variant
is around 0.5 percentage points lower than the Principal Projection. This
result is unsurprising given the savings-age proﬁles for Model A shown in
Figure 3 where the very old are predicted to have higher savings rates and
the young to have very low savings rates.
The predicted savings rates in Figure 11B are based on Model B and
they suggest that the diﬀerent demographic structures implied by the three
variants lead to virtually no change in the savings rates. The stretching
of the vertical axis somewhat exaggerates the diﬀerences, but in the year
33The NS rate is adjusted in the way described in Section 2.1.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 18
2040 the savings rates are all in the range 2.8-3.0%. The Young variant
anticipates a smaller proportion of old (dissavers) but a higher proportion
of 16-29 year-olds, whose savings rates are also low (and negative in the
age range 16-19 years). The net eﬀect is to leave aggregate savings largely
unaﬀected. In the Old variant the proportion of the elderly dissavers is
higher, but the proportion of the low-saving 16-29 year group is lower, again
leaving the aggregate savings rate roughly the same.
Overall, our results suggest that changes to the age structure that are
projected to occur over the next 40 years are likely to have modest eﬀects on
the personal sector savings rate. Because of the way pension contributions
are treated in our data sources, our estimates probably underestimate the
savings of working-age individuals. For this reason, the overall conclusion
we would draw from our results is that both o u rm e a s u r e so ft h es a v i n g s
rate are likely to rise modestly over the next 40 years in response to the
projected changes in age structure. This is especially likely for the ﬁrst half
of that period when the proportion of the late middle-aged is projected to
rise to a peak of approximately 27%, and especially true of the measure of
the savings rate which does not make any adjustment for the treatment of
pension income. However we would not expect any rise to be higher than 1
or 2 percentage points in either case. And we ﬁnd no basis for the view that
the aggregate savings rate will decline because of the anticipated ageing of
the UK population.
5 Conclusions
From micro-economic data we have derived estimates of the relationship
between the UK personal savings rate and the age-structure of the popula-
tion. Our results strongly suggest that changes in age-structure have had
detectable, sustained but modest eﬀects on the savings rate over the last 150
years and they are likely to continue to do so. The source of this inﬂuence is
mainly the eﬀect that one would expect from a simple lifecycle model: the
middle aged, and especially the later middle aged, tend to save a higher pro-
portion of their income than the young and the elderly, and so shifts between
the middle-aged and the young or elderly aﬀect the aggregate savings rate.
However, our estimates suggests that even these eﬀects are quite modest,
at least by the standards of the ﬂuctuations seen in the actual savings rate
over the previous 150 years. They also suggest that the projected changes
in the UK’s age-structure over the next 20-40 years will lead to a modest
increase in the savings rate, especially in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h a tp e r i o do fn o
more than 2 percentage points.Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 19
Data Appendix
Our data are derived from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), an an-
nual cross-section survey of around 7,000 UK households (or around 20,000
individuals) which has been extensively used in the analysis of consumption
behaviour.34 It collects detailed information on household and individual
consumption and income, and on household and individual characteristics.
Until 1993 the FES organised the data on a calendar year basis; since then
the data are organised on a ﬁnancial year basis. Our source allows us to
derive 30 consecutive calendar years of household and individual data from
1969 to 1998.
The measure of household income we use in this study is deﬁned in
the FES as ‘normal gross income, excluding tax and National Insurance
contributions but including income in kind’. It therefore includes private
pension contributions and beneﬁts but it excludes contributions to the state-
funded pension scheme.
Importantly, the FES provides details of the income of each individual
in the household, which permits us to calculate each individual’s income
on the same basis as household income, i.e. normal gross income exclud-
ing tax and National Insurance contributions but including income in kind.
Household-level income that is not directly attributable to individuals (for
example, rental income and some income in kind) is assigned in the FES
to the household head. We attribute such ‘common’ income to all income-
recipients within the household in proportion to their share in other income
components, though adopting the FES approach does not materially aﬀect
the conclusions we reach in this paper. Income from non-state pensions and
annuities are separately identiﬁed as an income source which allows us to
make the adjustment to pension income which we explain in more detail in
t h em a i nb o d yo ft h ep a p e r .
The deﬁnition of household consumption we use is total expenditure
by household members. Calculating individual consumption is more prob-
lematic, since much consumption is organised at the household level (e.g.
housing, utilities, household durable goods, food for consumption within the
home etc.) and such spending cannot easily be attributed to individuals,
even where the individual who made the expenditure is identiﬁed.
Other variables retrieved from the FES are: the number of children
(deﬁned as those aged 17 years and under) in the household; the number of
adults in the household; and the ages of all household members.
34Notable recent examples are Banks et al. (1998), Paxson (1996) and Deaton and
Paxson (1997). The FES is considered suﬃciently accurate for the analysis of consumption
and savings. Atkinson and Micklewright (1983) suggest that there is little evidence of
under-reporting in the income series, with the exception of investment income. Attanasio
and Weber (1993) suggest that for consumption, ‘under-reporting is noticeable only on
alcohol, a relatively small item. Expenditure on other items is thought to be accurately
recorded, thanks to the careful sampling design’ (p. 633).Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate 20
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2000-Based Population Projections
(Government Actuaries Department)
Principal Young Old Very High Life 
Expectancy
2000 2025 2040 2025 2040 2025 2040 2025 2040
Total Population (000) 59,756 64,836 65,837 68,011 71,367 61,808 60,686 66,155 68,225
Proportion Age 16-29 17.82% 16.08% 16.06% 16.49% 17.32% 15.68% 14.64% 15.78% 15.53%
Proportion Age 30-44 23.01% 19.91% 18.15% 19.88% 18.55% 19.90% 17.66% 19.57% 17.58%
Proportion Age 45-64 23.37% 26.50% 24.88% 25.75% 24.05% 27.23% 25.65% 26.25% 24.35%
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